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Abstract. Miracles are commonly understood in the way David Hume defined 
them: as violations of the laws of nature. I argue, however, that the conjunction 
of Hume’s definition with a  neo-Humean view of the laws of nature yields 
objectionable consequences. In particular, the two jointly imply that some 
miracles are logically impossible. A  better way of thinking about miracles, 
I suggest, is on a neo-Aristotelian metaphysics. On that view, the laws of nature 
contain built-in ceteris paribus clauses that allow for the possibility of external 
influences in the natural world. Miracles, understood as instances of external, 
divine influence, would therefore neither violate the laws of nature nor be 
instances of those laws. In this respect, neo-Aristotelians have an advantage over 
neo-Humeans in providing a coherent account of miracles.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to David Hume, miracles are violations of the laws of nature 
by God’s will.1 Hume’s definition has profoundly impacted subsequent 
philosophical and theological discussions on the nature of divine 
activity in the world. Part of my objective in this essay is to point out the 
inadequacy of Hume’s definition when it is conjoined with a neo-Humean 
understanding of the laws of nature.2 Neo-Humeans typically think of 
1 In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume writes, ‘A  miracle is 
a transgression of the laws of nature by the volition of Deity.’ David Hume, An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, in Modern Philosophy: An  Anthology of Primary 
Sources, ed. by Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 
1988), pp. 533-600 (p. 537). For this essay, I adopt the usual interpretation of ‘transgression’ 
as ‘violation’.
2 For an extended critique of Hume’s definition of a miracle in general, see Timothy 
McGrew, ‘Miracles’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, 
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the laws of nature in terms of (i) an ‘exceptionless generalization’ view 
or (ii) a ‘best systems’ view. I maintain, however, that the conjunction of 
either view with Hume’s definition yields objectionable consequences. 
Specifically, when conjoined with Hume’s definition, the exceptionless 
generalization view entails that miracles are logically impossible, and 
the best systems view precludes the possibility of what I call recurrent 
miracles, i.e. divine activity that is exercised regularly and predictably.
A  better way to think about miracles, I  suggest, is within a  neo-
Aristotelian framework.3 According to Neo-Aristotelians such as 
Alexander Bird, the laws of nature track dispositional properties that 
are found in nature.4 These properties, according to Bird, are subject to 
what are called finks or masks, i.e. conditions that prevent a disposition 
from being manifested.5 As a consequence, the laws of nature have ceteris 
paribus clauses built into them: the laws hold only in the absence of finks 
and masks. Miracles, I suggest, might be seen as cases of divine finks and 
masks.6 On such a view, miracles are not violations of the laws of nature, 
as Hume believed. Rather, they are unique instances of divine activity 
that interact with the dispositional capacities found in the world.
The aforementioned ideas are developed and defended in three 
sections. In section one, I argue that the Humean definition of a miracle 
conjoined with neo-Humean views of the laws of nature yield the 
inadequate results mentioned above. In section two, I  present Bird’s 
dispositionalist interpretation of the laws of nature and show how 
miracles might be seen as divine finks and masks. Finally, in section three, 
I conclude by considering several objections to the proposed account.
Winter 2014, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/miracles/> [accessed 
28 April 2015].
3 For another author writing along similar lines, see Benedikt Paul Göcke, ‘Did God 
Do It? Metaphysical Models and Theological Hermeneutics’, International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 78, No. 2 (2015), 215-231.
4 Alexander Bird, Nature’s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p. 2.
5 Ibid., pp. 25-29.
6 This is not to say, of course, that divine finks and masks are the exclusive means 
of divine activity in the world. Divine activity might come in other forms. Part of the 
point of my exposition is to show that at least a  class of miracles might occur in the 
world without violating the laws of nature, and such activity makes more sense under 
a  neo-Aristotelian interpretation of nature’s laws than it does under a  neo-Humean 
interpretation.
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I. MIRACLES WITHIN NEO-HUMEANISM
As noted above, Hume considered miracles to be violations of the laws 
of nature by God’s will. One of the main difficulties in understanding 
Hume on this point is that he spoke little of what the laws of nature are 
supposed to be.7 It is widely recognized, however, that Hume’s broader 
views on causation gave rise to what is known as the Regularity theory 
of the laws of nature.8 According to the Regularity theory, the laws of 
nature express patterns of modally disconnected events in the world. 
David Lewis compares the regularity of the world’s events to a vast glass 
mosaic: from a distance, one can see patterns emerge in the entire mosaic; 
nevertheless, these patterns are merely the sum of disconnected pieces 
of glass.9 Similarly, laws of nature are patterns of modally disconnected 
events. Neo-Humeans since Hume have devoted considerable effort 
in formulating more precise versions of the Regularity theory. Part of 
my project, therefore, will be to explore what neo-Humeans have said 
concerning the laws of nature.
Neo-Humean theories about the laws of nature come in two broad 
varieties: the exceptionless generalization view and the best systems view. 
I will now examine both and indicate the consequences of conjoining 
each with Hume’s definition.
1.1 The Exceptionless Generalization View
The exceptionless generalization view, as its name implies, states that the 
laws of nature admit of no exceptions. D. H. Mellor explains that on this 
view, ‘law statements [...] are (or at least entail) 100% generalizations of 
the form “All αs are βs”’.10 As a result of empirical inquiry, humans are able 
to make universal generalizations concerning the natural regularities 
they observe in the world. If some event E occurs that does not conform 
to a  present universal generalization G, we construct a  new universal 
generalization G’ that accounts for E. In other words, we claim that G 
did not truly reflect the laws of nature. Ultimately, there is a universal 
7 David Armstrong, What is a  Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), p. 4.
8 Ibid.
9 David Lewis, Philosophical Papers Volume II (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986), p. ix.
10 D. H. Mellor, Matters of Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), p. 162.
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generalization G* that reflects regularities exceptionlessly and therefore 
represents the laws of nature without aberration.11 G* might turn out to 
be a very complex set of descriptions; yet once it is established, there are 
no exceptions to G*.
Hume’s definition of a  miracle, however, yields objectionable 
consequences when conjoined with the exceptionless generalization 
view. For their conjunction would render miracles logically impossible. 
If we accept that miracles are violations of the laws of nature and that 
the laws of nature are nothing but exceptionless regularities, it follows 
that miracles are violations of natural regularities, which on the 
exceptionless regularity view are impossible.12 Christopher Hughes 
puts the argument another way: ‘If miracles are possible, then either 
miracles are not violations of the laws of nature, or the laws of nature 
are not (necessarily) exceptionless.’13 But, as we have seen, neither of 
Hughes’s disjuncts is acceptable to the advocate of both the exceptionless 
generalization view and Hume’s definition.14 I suggest that the foregoing 
argument’s conclusion, i.e. that miracles are logically impossible, ought 
to be undesirable to both theists and most atheists. Theists, I presume, 
believe that miracles actually occur (or have occurred in the past). 
And most atheists typically assert that although miracles do not in fact 
occur, their occurrence is nonetheless logically possible.15 E. J. Lowe has 
conjectured that Hume himself probably did not hold to an exceptionless 
11 Stephen Mumford, ‘Normative and Natural Laws’, Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 292 
(2000), 265-82 (p. 276). Popper describes this view in Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 62. As is well known, Popper’s point is that one 
exception is all that is needed to falsify a law.
12 It is important to note that on the present view the impossibility of miracles (as 
defined by Hume) does not imply that God cannot act in the world. Rather, it means that 
if God were to act, his act would not be a miracle but instead a part or instance of the 
laws of nature. This consequence seems immediately counterintuitive, as I will suggest 
later in the paper.
13 Christopher Hughes and Robert M. Adams, ‘Miracles, Laws of Nature and 
Causation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 66, No.2 (1992), 179-205 & 207-
24, (p. 186).
14 I am in agreement with Steven Mumford on this point. See Mumford, ‘Normative 
and Natural Laws’, p. 269.
15 I  admit that the above argument would not be persuasive to the type of atheist 
who grants that miracles are logically impossible to begin with. The conjunction of the 
exceptionless generalization view and Hume’s definition would entail their conclusion. 
I suspect, however, that such atheists are rare. Most, it seems, acknowledge at least the 
possibility of miracles even if none occur in the actual world. In any case, my arguments 
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generalization view of the laws of nature.16 For if he had, then Hume’s 
later project of arguing that no testimony could be sufficient to establish 
a miracle would be trivial: one could simply rule out miracles a priori.
Thus, the neo-Humean confronts a challenge: how might she under-
stand miracles in a way that does not render the occurrence of miracles 
logically impossible? In one of his papers, Lewis puts forward a position 
that would answer this challenge. The approach Lewis takes is to modify 
the term ‘miracle’ to mean a violation of the laws of nature not of this 
world, but of some other possible world. More generally, consider two 
worlds, w1 and w0. A miracle might take place in w1, where the miracle is 
a violation of the laws of nature not of w1 but of w0. Lewis states:
When I say that a miracle takes place at w1, I mean that there is a violation 
of the laws of nature. But note that the violated laws are not the laws of 
the same world where they are violated [...] a miracle at w1, relative to w0, 
is a violation at w1 of the laws of w0.17
In other words, Lewis supposes that violations of the laws of nature are 
possible but only relative to different worlds in which different laws hold.
What are we to make of this position? I  think Lewis’s modification 
does not solve the problem without yielding absurd consequences. 
I will consider two main points. First, Lewis’s modification of the term 
‘miracle’ would still entail that any event – no matter how unusual or 
seemingly supernatural  – is a  part of the laws of nature in the actual 
world. Suppose that my friend comes up to me and loudly declares, 
‘I command you to levitate.’ Suddenly, I begin to hover three feet above 
where I previously stood. Call the world in which this event takes place 
the ‘levitation-world’. If Lewis is correct, such an event in the levitation-
world would be a miracle relative to some other possible world (like ours, 
presumably) in which no one ever levitates. But it would still remain the 
case that relative to the levitation-world, the event would be a part of the 
laws of nature. No laws of nature are violated in the levitation-world, for 
the laws (on the exceptionless generalization view) subsume all events. 
are directed to those who hold that miraculous divine interventions are, if not actual, at 
least logically possible. Thanks to Kevin Timpe for comments here.
16 E. J. Lowe is perplexed by the unsatisfactory conclusion of the Humean argument 
which he regards as ‘too easy’. See his ‘Miracles and Laws of Nature’, Religious Studies, Vol. 
23, No. 2 (1987), p. 263, p. 270.
17 David Lewis, Philosophical Papers Volume II (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986), pp. 44-45.
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The  levitation-event might be surprising (especially if the levitation-
world is like ours up until the levitation-event), but it would it would 
not thereby be an exception to the laws of nature.18 This consequence, 
however, seems immediately counterintuitive. The correct response from 
the denizens of levitation-world would be to think that my friend has 
some mysterious, supernatural ability to bring about an event beyond 
the laws of nature that are operative in that world. But, as we have seen, 
the exceptionless generalization view precludes that possibility.
Second, construing miracles as law-violations in other possible 
worlds yields an even more absurd consequence, namely, it makes the 
occurrence of miracles too easy. Consider: presumably there is a possible 
world W in which everyone on earth suddenly levitates three feet above 
where they are located. But then the fact that in the actual world we 
are not levitating would count as a miracle relative to world W. It would 
therefore be a miracle that everyone does not levitate in the actual world. 
Such cases can be generalized: any event in the actual world that diverges 
from the laws in other worlds would count as a miracle. In light of these 
counterintuitive consequences, I suggest that Lewis’s modification does 
not help the exceptionless generalization view. Rather, the Humean 
should stick to Hume’s original conception of a miracle: a miracle in W is 
a violation of the laws of nature in W. But then we are brought back to our 
original conclusion: Hume’s definition conjoined with the exceptionless 
generalization view entails that miracles are logically impossible.
1.2. The Best Systems View
A more sophisticated version of the Regularity theory, however, is open 
to neo-Humeans. It is known as the ‘best systems’ view, most prominently 
defended by Lewis and David Ramsey. According to this view, not every 
regularity counts as a  law of nature. Rather, laws of nature are to be 
understood as the best systematization of the regularities, where ‘best’ 
is understood in terms of postulating the fewest possible axioms from 
which one can derive the maximum number of events in the world.19 
In other words, laws of nature on the best systems view are determined 
18 The laws of nature on the universal generalization are said to be observer-
independent. In other words, they lack epistemic conditions on them. Thus, the fact 
that some particular event might be surprising or unpredictable given one’s current 
knowledge of the world has no bearing on the nature of the laws themselves on this view.
19 Robert Adams considers this a possibility for the Regularity theorist. See Adams 
and Hughes, ‘Miracles, Laws of Nature and Causation’, 179-205 & 207-24, (p. 212).
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by a balance of their strength and simplicity in accounting for the vast 
mosaic of disconnected qualities in the world.
Is it possible to understand Humean miracles within this best systems 
approach? It appears so, at least initially. On such a view, miracles would 
be events which lie ‘outside’ the regularities entailed by the laws of nature. 
In his book The Concept of a  Miracle, Richard Swinburne, although 
himself not a neo-Humean about the laws of nature,20 provides a way 
in which one might do this. He claims that ‘One must [...] distinguish 
between a formula being a law and a formula being (universally) true or 
being a law which holds without exception’.21 Embracing this distinction, 
Swinburne claims that miracles might suitably be called violations of 
the laws of nature where the laws of nature do not imply universality 
(exceptionlessness). Such a model might work as follows. Consider some 
purportedly miraculous event E and a law of nature L (both in the same 
world). We saw earlier that on the exceptionless generalization view, E 
would necessarily be subsumed under a further set of laws L1. But this is 
not the case on the best systems approach. It is not necessarily true that 
E can be subsumed under a new set of laws. Swinburne explains:
[...] L will have to be retained as a  law of nature and E regarded as 
a  non-repeatable counter-instance to it, if any proposed rival formula 
L1 were too much more complicated than L without giving better new 
predictions, or predicted new phenomena unsuccessfully where L 
predicted successfully.22
Using the criterion Swinburne provides, it seems that there is logical 
space for events outside the laws of nature as long as these events are 
sufficiently irregular such that incorporating them into a new set of laws 
would make the resulting laws less adequate in terms of simplicity and 
strength.
While the best systems view is certainly an  advance over the 
exceptionless generalization view, I  maintain that it suffers from at 
least one major defect, namely, it excludes the possibility of what I call 
recurrent miracles. Recurrent miracles are a species of divine action in 
the world that occur in a regular, predictable manner and that satisfy the 
20 From a recent personal conversation. Also, see Richard Swinburne, Mind, Brain, 
and Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 125-40.
21 Richard Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 30. 
Italics in original.
22 Ibid., p. 29.
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conditions necessary to be included in the best system of natural laws. For 
instance, suppose that every time I release a pen in mid-air, God causes 
the pen to fly up into space instead of falling to the ground. Suppose 
this phenomenon occurs not just to me but to everyone in a  regular, 
predictable manner. Of course, this scenario is logically possible. If this 
were to occur, however, the best systems view would have to categorize 
such behaviour as an instance of a law of nature. For suppose that it did 
not: there would then be a vast range of phenomena that the axioms of 
the best system would not account for. Thus, these recurrent miracles 
would have to be included as part of the laws of nature rather than being 
violations of them. But then our previous problem reappears: given 
Hume’s definition, recurrent miracles would not be miracles at all. In 
other words, the best systems view implies that recurrent miracles, as 
I have defined them here, are logically impossible.
Again, this conclusion ought to be problematic for those (theists 
and most atheists) who think that recurrent miracles are logically 
possible. Indeed, some Christians hold that recurrent miracles are not 
only logically possible but also actual. For instance, some maintain 
that the real transformation of the bread and wine into the body and 
blood of Christ takes place in a regular, predictable manner, and under 
specified conditions.23 Some Christians think that God miraculously 
unites a person’s soul to his or her body at the moment of conception. 
Such miracles would again be regular and predictable under specified 
circumstances.24 These, I  suppose, might be cases of actual, recurrent 
miracles. Nevertheless, my claim is weaker: I  contend only that such 
miracles are possible, and my thesis goes through on this much weaker 
assumption.
The conclusion I  gather from the discussion of the best systems 
view is this: the account makes logical room for miracles as long as 
such events are highly irregular and do not fit within the best system 
of laws. It is perfectly possible, however, that recurrent miracles should 
23 For instance, in Summa 3, question 76, article 8, Aquinas writes concerning the 
Eucharist: ‘It remains to be said, that, while the dimensions remain the same as before, 
there is a miraculous change wrought in the other accidents, such as shape, colour, and 
the rest ... And, as was said already, this is not deception, because it is done “to represent 
the truth” namely, to show by this miraculous apparition that Christ’s body and blood are 
truly in this sacrament.’ Italics mine. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, available at: 
<http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4076.htm> [accessed September 4, 2014].
24 I have Luis Pinto de Sá to thank for these examples.
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exist. But when conjoined with Hume’s definition of a miracle, the best 
systems view entails that they cannot exist. Thus, we are landed back 
with the same problem afflicting the exceptionless generalization view. 
Yet surely this is wrong, for it is entirely possible that God might perform 
recurrent miracles.
To summarize the first section, I want to draw attention to the deeper 
problem that, I  think, afflicts the Humean position regarding miracles 
and the laws of nature. When the Humean denies the existence of real 
causal connections and intrinsic dispositions within nature, she is left 
trying to build ‘laws’ out of the regularities the world’s vast array of 
disconnected events. The problem, as I hope to have shown, is that there 
might be miracles that fit any such law-construction which the Humean 
puts together. The upshot is that miracles become parts or instances of 
the laws of nature. When conjoined with Hume’s definition of a miracle, 
of course, such miracles are ruled out by definition. This unwanted 
consequence strongly suggests that we should look elsewhere for a more 
sensible account of miracles.
II. DISPOSITIONALISM AND MIRACLES
In this section, I  propose a  different, more intuitive way to think of 
miracles within the context of a neo-Aristotelian metaphysics. The view 
I have in mind assumes a metaphysical position regarding the nature of 
properties known as dispositionalism. The roots of dispositionalism can 
be traced back to Aristotle, and its recent defenders include Alexander 
Bird, Stephen Mumford, Brian Ellis and Caroline Lierse, E. J. Lowe, 
Sydney Shoemaker, and others.25 For the purposes of this paper, I will 
regard Bird’s view as representative of the dispositionalist account.
Dispositionalism, according to Bird, is the view that all properties have 
their particular dispositions essentially; for an entity E to have a property 
means that E is disposed to bring about a particular manifestation (or 
manifestations) under a  certain stimulus.26 Further, that particular 
property has those exact dispositions in all possible worlds (at least in 
25 Alexander Bird, ‘The Dispositionalist Conception of Laws’, Foundations of Science, 
10 (2005), 353-70; Mumford, ‘Normative and Natural Laws’, pp.  265-82; Brian Ellis 
and Caroline Lierse, ‘Dispositional essentialism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72 
(1994), 27–45; Lowe, ‘Miracles and Laws of Nature’, pp.  263-78; Sydney Shoemaker, 
Identity, Cause, and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
26 Alexander Bird, ‘The Dispositionalist Conception of Laws’, pp. 354-55.
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those in which the property is instantiated). For example, electrons have 
the property being negatively charged and, by virtue of this property, have 
the essential disposition to repel other negatively charged objects. The 
conditional analysis of a disposition can be represented as:
(CA) ∀x (Dx ↔ (Sx □→ Mx))
where D is a  disposition, S a  stimulus, and M a  manifestation. This 
biconditional states that x has a certain disposition D just in case if x 
were under a stimulus S, then x would manifest M. The laws of nature, 
in turn, are derivable from the nature of properties. From (CA), Bird is 
logically able to arrive at
(L) ∀x ((Dx & Sx) → Mx)
which is the statement of the law of nature.27 And since the dispositionalist 
asserts that properties have their dispositions essentially, Bird concludes 
that laws of nature, if they track the essences of dispositions, will be 
metaphysically necessary.28
Bird soon recognizes, however, that (L) is defective as it stands. For 
an  entity might have a  dispositional property and yet fail to yield its 
manifestation when it is appropriately stimulated. Bird uses the example 
of a vase that has the dispositional property F, being fragile. Under normal 
circumstances, a vase that has F will break when struck with a hammer. 
Suppose that this particular vase has F but that when it is struck with 
a  hammer, the strike instantly causes the vase to heat up thereby 
preventing the vase from breaking.29 C. B. Martin has labelled this type of 
disposition finkish.30 Alternatively, to use Lewis’s example, suppose that 
at the very instant the vase is struck with a hammer, a powerful wizard 
casts a spell on the vase causing its internal structure to become rigid; as 
a result, the vase does not break. In this case, the wizard has ‘finked’ the 
vase. Before the vase is struck, it has the intrinsic disposition to break 
when struck. Yet it is false that if the vase were struck, then it would 
break. Both of the above examples provide counterexamples to (L).
Consider, as another example, the hemlock responsible for killing 
Socrates. The hemlock has the dispositional property of being deadly 
when ingested. Yet, suppose Socrates takes an antidote immediately after 
27 Ibid., pp. 355.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 358.
30 C. B. Martin, ‘Finkish Dispositions’, Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (1994), 1-8.
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the poisonous ingestion; as a result, he does not die from the hemlock. 
Do we conclude that the hemlock lacked the property being deadly 
when ingested? No. We say that although the hemlock did have that 
dispositional property the antidote introduced an external feature that 
prevented the disposition from being manifested. Bird refers to such 
a  feature by the technical term antidote, which is also known as (and 
which I will refer to from now on as) a mask.
Therefore, we can now see that any dispositionalist account needs 
to describe the laws of nature in the absence of finks and masks. Bird 
does this by refining (L) and introducing a ceteris paribus clause into the 
formulation:31
(L’) [∀x ((Dx & Sx) → Mx), so long as D’s finks and masks are 
absent]
Under this construction, the laws of nature are consistent with 
dispositions’ existing while not bringing about their characteristic 
manifestations.
Given these conceptual resources, I  suggest that there can be 
a coherent understanding of miracles within the metaphysical framework 
of dispositionalism.32 On such a view, miracles do not violate the laws 
of nature; rather, they are events whose causal source lies outside the 
dispositional capacities found in the world.33 Some of God’s miraculous 
actions in the world would be cases of divine finks and masks. He would 
31 Alexander Bird, Nature’s Metaphysics, p. 60.
32 For an  excellent exposition of this view, see Toby Handfield, ‘Dispositional 
Essentialism and the Possibility of a Law-Abiding Miracle’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 
Vol. 51, 205 (Oct., 2001), 484-94. Handfield shows how miracles are law-abiding within 
the framework of dispositional essentialism. My approach takes some of these same ideas 
and applies them specifically to theistic miracles, such as the resurrection. In particular, 
my aim is to show how the dispositional essentialist view regarding miracles is superior 
to the Humean regularity view.
33 At this point, I might be accused of asymmetry in my attack on neo-Humeanism 
and proposal of neo-Aristotelianism. For while I argue that violations (or at least certain 
violations) of the laws of nature are impossible on the neo-Humean account, the same 
is true of the dispositional account. To violate a  law on the dispositional account is 
impossible because the laws are metaphysically necessary. However, as I explained earlier, 
the Humean is left with only one equally implausible option: the view that miracles 
are parts (or instances) of the laws of nature. By contrast, the dispositionalist is able to 
distinguish events which are neither violations nor parts of the laws of nature. This third 
option – that miracles are divine interventions which neither violate the laws of nature 
nor are subsumed by the laws – is unavailable to the neo-Humean.
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have empirical effects in the world none of which would alter or break 
the laws of nature.34
Consider a couple of examples. Suppose we reduce the entire event 
of the Red Sea’s35 parting to a couple water molecules that have a natural 
disposition to attract each other through the process of cohesion. Each 
of the molecules has the dispositional property of being attracted to other 
water molecules in close proximity. Now, when God intervenes, he causes 
the proximate molecules to separate rather than to unite. Thus, the 
molecules miraculously separate since the disposition of the molecules 
to attract is not manifested. In this case, God’s external influence is 
a mask in the system. And since, according to (L’), laws of nature require 
dispositions to yield their manifestations only in the absence of finks 
and masks, the miracle of the parting water molecules occurs without 
altering or violating the laws of nature.
Consider another example. When human beings die, their bodies 
have the disposition to remain dead, to decompose, etc. It is true, then, 
that in the absence of finks and masks, the laws of nature preclude a dead 
man’s body coming back to life. But, suppose that in the case of Christ’s 
post-crucifixion body, God intervenes in the world by introducing 
a  divine fink. He changes the biochemical structure of Christ’s body 
such that it does not manifest the usual dead-body dispositions. Such 
a miracle would not count as a breaking of the laws of nature because 
the dispositionalist claims that the laws proscribe men from resurrecting 
from the dead in the absence of finks and masks. Lewis’s sorcerer casts 
a spell on the vase such that it does not manifest its fragile dispositions 
when struck. Similarly, God might change the structure of Christ’s body 
so that his body’s ordinary, dead-person dispositions are not manifested. 
Once again, such a miracle would be consistent with the laws of nature 
as formulated in (L’).
Further, the dispositionalist is easily able to account for recurrent 
miracles: finks and masks might occur an  unlimited number of 
times, regularly and predictably, without violating any laws of nature. 
By contrast, on the best systems view, recurrent miracles must be 
incorporated into the best system of laws and therefore become parts of 
the laws themselves.
34 As I mentioned in footnote 6, I do not mean to imply that this is the exclusive way 
that God might act in the world. Divine activity might come in many forms, and what 
I am describing is simply one of them.
35 Or perhaps more accurately, the Sea of Reeds.
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In sum, I  have sketched a  way of thinking about miracles that, in 
my mind, is an advance over the Humean way of understanding them. 
By introducing dispositions into the structure of the world, the neo-
Aristotelian has the conceptual resources to think of miracles as events 
that occur beyond the natural dispositions of objects. The laws of nature 
track the nature of dispositions and therefore do not depend – unlike the 
Humean account – on constructing laws out of regularities.
III. SEVERAL OBJECTIONS
I will now consider four objections to the account I have proposed. First, 
one might worry that the possibility of recurrent miracles suggests that 
we might not be able to identify such regular events as miracles. For if 
God regularly finks or masks a  certain disposition, we might confuse 
the miracle with a law of nature. Call this the epistemic problem. A few 
points in response. First, I think the dispositionalist will have to bite the 
bullet and acknowledge this possibility. But while this problem is merely 
an  epistemic problem on the dispositional view, it is a  much worse 
problem on the Humean account. The Humean account entails, as I have 
argued, that recurrent miracles are logically impossible. By contrast, the 
dispositionalist will, at worse, claim that we cannot know that a recurrent 
miracle has occurred. Even in the worst case scenario, therefore, the 
dispositionalist’s problem is less acute. Second, we might in fact be able 
to know which miracles are recurrent by independent means. Those who 
place epistemic authority on divine revelation or tradition might have 
a means of knowing, for example, that transubstantiation is a recurrent 
miracle rather than a law of nature. Third, there does not seem to be any 
good a priori reason to think that humans should expect to be able to 
identify all recurrent miracles. Perhaps God has motives for keeping at 
least some recurrent miracles hidden. For these reasons, I do not think 
the epistemic problem is compelling.
A second worry is that finks and masks might be the results of our 
epistemic limitations regarding fundamental properties. Suppose – the 
objection goes – that the laws of nature contain ceteris paribus clauses that 
govern higher-order, derivative properties (e.g. fragility or the property 
of being poisonous) but that such clauses do not apply to fundamental 
properties (e.g., negative charge). Bird, for instance, maintains that 
finkish dispositions do not exist at the fundamental level and that it is 
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possible that masks do not either.36 If this is right, then the problem is 
that God has no ‘room’ to intervene at the fundamental level in the form 
of divine finks or masks. And if we further suppose that higher-order, 
derivative properties are ultimately reducible to fundamental ones, then 
the worry might be that God cannot intervene in this way at any level.
A couple of points can be made in response to this objection. First, 
even if the fundamental laws of nature contain no ceteris paribus clauses, 
this does not necessarily imply that higher-order laws lack them as well. 
The implication would follow only if one were to assume reductionism 
or eliminativism about the laws of nature. However, there are strong 
reasons for thinking that such inter-level reductionism is misguided.37 
Second, while I grant along with Bird that finkish dispositions cannot 
apply to fundamental properties (a fink works by altering the causal basis 
of a disposition; and fundamental properties, by definition, do not have 
a causal bases), the story is different regarding masks. There is nothing 
internally inconsistent about masking a  fundamental disposition. 
Bird believes that it is ultimately an  empirical matter whether there 
are dispositions sensitive to masks. But given that the existence of 
fundamental masks is not metaphysically impossible, there is nothing 
incoherent about the idea that some fundamental disposition D toward 
a manifestation M might be masked by God. Therefore, this objection 
does not constitute a persuasive argument against the present account.
A  third objection comes from considerations offered by Robert 
Adams.38 Although Adams is sympathetic to an account similar to what 
I  have sketched, he provides the following worry to the possibility of 
divine finking and masking.39 Consider some entity X with a certain set 
of dispositional properties. If God has the power to fink/mask some of 
X’s dispositions, then presumably he has the power to fink/mask all of 
X’s dispositions for a certain period of time (say, an hour). Suppose that 
were the case; it is then hard to see (a) how X could remain in existence 
without manifesting any of its dispositions, and (b) how X could persist 
36 Alexander Bird, Nature’s Metaphysics, pp. 60-65.
37 For instance, this is one of the main points put forward by John Dupré and Nancy 
Cartwright. See John Dupré, The Disorder of Things (MA: Harvard University Press, 
1993). See also Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World: A  Study of the Boundaries of 
Science (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
38 This same objection receives a  similar response from Benedikt Paul Göcke. See 
Göcke, ‘Did God Do It?’, p. 12.
39 Adams and Hughes, ‘Miracles, Laws of Nature and Causation’, pp. 221-23.
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over time if there is a certain period (an hour) in which it manifests none 
of its dispositions.40
Answering (a), I will assume, is sufficient for answering (b), for the 
worry behind (b) is that X does not persist through time because X’s 
identity depends on a continuity of the manifestation of X’s dispositions 
over time. A couple points can be made in response to Adams’s worry. 
First, if God were to fink/mask all of a thing’s dispositions, I am not certain 
it would have the consequences that Adams envisions. For while a thing’s 
identity might depend on its possessing certain properties, it is not obvious 
that its identity depends on its manifesting those properties. Consider 
a grain of salt, for instance, which has certain properties: the disposition 
to dissolve in water, the disposition to cause a salty taste in my mouth, 
and the disposition to appear to have a white colour. If such dispositions 
were entirely removed, then Adams is correct: we might wonder how the 
grain of salt can legitimately be called a grain of salt. However, suppose 
the grain of salt retains the dispositions even though they are finked/
masked. There is nothing conceptually incoherent, I suggest, in thinking 
that this grain of salt should exist even if its dispositions – to dissolve in 
water, to produce a salty taste, to produce a white ‘look’ – are temporarily 
finked/masked. Second, even if I  am wrong about my first point, the 
dispositionalist might respond that while God might have the ability to 
fink/mask all of X’s dispositions, he might in fact refrain from doing so 
precisely for that reason: doing so would make X go out of existence (that 
is, assuming that Adams’s conclusion is correct). Thus, God, as a matter 
of contingent fact, might not engage in the total finking/masking that 
Adams imagines. In sum, I think Adams worries, though important, are 
not sufficient to undermine the dispositionalist account of miracles that 
I have offered.
Finally, one might wonder whether the laws of nature are such that 
the ceteris paribus clause ought to include only natural finks and masks 
and exclude supernatural ones. In other words, one might think that 
the laws should take into account possible external interference only 
from the dispositions of natural things instead of actions from God. In 
40 At the end of his article, Adams hints at a  possible solution that involves the 
Thomistic idea that there is one fundamental disposition, the liability to be affected by 
God, that cannot be obstructed by God and which grounds the continued existence of 
an entity. While this might be a possibility, my response to Adams’s objection will not 
invoke the existence of such a fundamental disposition.
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response, I agree with Toby Handfield that such a restriction on the laws 
of nature would be entirely arbitrary.41 What justification can be offered 
for the restriction of the laws to only natural finks and masks? It is hard 
to see how the restriction could be empirically justified, at least in a non-
question begging way; and there is certainly no a priori reason to think 
that such supernatural interventions are impossible. Thus, the denial of 
the possibility of divine finks and masks is as strong as the denial of the 
possibility of miracles in general. Unless the objection begs the question 
against the dispositionalist account of miracles, I conclude that it lacks 
any force.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the Humean definition of miracles is unsatisfactory 
given a  neo-Humean Regularity theory about the laws of nature. 
Both primary versions of the Regularity theory  – the exceptionless 
generalization view and the best systems view – entail that at least some 
miracles are logically impossible. This is an unwanted result for theists and 
atheists who affirm the logical possibility of miracles. By contrast, within 
the neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of dispositionalism one can think of 
miracles not as violations of the laws of nature but as divine activity that 
interacts with the dispositional capacities in the natural world. Miracles 
in the form of divine finks and masks would be entirely consistent with 
laws of nature since those laws contain built-in ceteris paribus clauses. 
In this regard, therefore, the neo-Aristotelian view makes better sense of 
miracles than the neo-Humean account does.42
41 Handfield, ‘Dispositional Essentialism’, p. 490. Handfield maintains that the 
dispositionalist might simply deny that determinism regarding the laws of nature is 
possible. This is essentially the same point I’m making with respect to divine intervention 
in the world.
42 A special thanks for valuable comments from Eleonore Stump, Robert J. Hartman, 
Andrew Pinsent, Vincent Archer, and an anonymous reviewer. In addition, this paper 
received valuable feedback from audiences at the Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and 
Religion at Oxford University and at a summer seminar in Analytic Theology hosted by 
the University of Innsbruck.
